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SUMMARY: 1. Pharmaceutical patents, the access to essential medicines and the 
question of innovation - 2. The actual and/or potential between the rights of inventors, 
international human rights law, trade rules and public health. The everlasting 
controversy on the allegedly adverse impact of intellectual property protection on access 
to medicines and health technologies - 3. Are human rights and intellectual property law 
really in conflict? A relation of interpretation, not of conflict - 4. Conclusions. 
 
 
1 - Pharmaceutical patents, the access to essential medicines and the 
question of innovation  
 
The immense advancement in knowledge, science and technology that has 
characterized the last century and half has profoundly improved medical 
innovation and the health of millions of people. In a relatively short period, 
the discover of successful vaccines (like polio or the recent introduction of 
a vaccine for rotavirus), the development of triple-drug antiretroviral 
(ARV) therapy to cure AIDS, new treatments for tuberculosis, malaria, 
hepatitis C, cancer and many other non-communicable diseases (NCDs), as 
well as new therapies based on discoveries in genetics, personalized 
therapies based on molecularly-targeted medicines, stem-cell based 
medicines, have substantially contributed to reduce some of the most 
common killers associated with chronic and catastrophic diseases. All these 
medical innovation, health technologies and new medicines have resulted 
into a drastic reduction in deaths, thus transforming many of the formerly 
deadly and incurable diseases from death sentences into manageable 
diseases.  
Yet, in spite of this notable advancement, more than nearly one third 
of the world population is left behind without access to the benefits of the 
                                                          
 Il contributo, sottoposto a valutazione, rirpoduce il testo della relazione tenuta al XXI 
Convegno della Società italiana di Diritto internazionale e Diritto dell’Unione Europea 
(Parma, 9-10 giugno 2016) “La tutela della salute nel diritto internazionale ed europeo tra interessi 
globali e interessi particolari“, ed è pubblicato a stampa nel volume dal medesimo titolo, a 
cura di L. Pineschi, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2017. 
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above-mentioned advances and continue to die, being denied the access to 
health care, including affordable, safe, efficacious and quality medicines, 
vaccines, diagnostics and medical devices, necessary to prevent and treat 
illness1. Notwithstanding a rapid increase in technological and economic 
potential, that in principle implies an enhanced ability to overcome 
problems related to poverty and poor health, recent years have seen an 
actual deterioration in health status in many countries, largely as a result 
of HIV/AIDS, still one of the leading cause of death in some locations (like 
in sub-Saharan Africa) and in populations that are typically excluded or 
marginalized2; but also because of a resurgence in other infectious diseases 
and a growing burden of no communicable diseases, which are estimated 
to kill worldwide around 50 million people per year3. Many more efforts 
are needed to fully eradicate a wide range of diseases and addressing many 
different persistent and emerging health issues4. Particularly, there is the 
need of huge investments in important health emergency and the necessity 
for innovators to consider how drugs and new technologies can reach those 
most in need5. In addition, there is a precise responsibility of governments 
to find the proper solution to ensure access for all, without discrimination, 
to medicines, particularly to essential medicines, that are affordable, safe, 
efficacious and of quality6.  
These concerns explain why the current intellectual property 
(hereinafter: IP) system is at the very centre of the global cross-cutting 
discussion on the existing obstacles to providing access to medicines and 
health technologies as fundamental elements of the full realization of the 
human right to health. Intellectual property rights are in fact a very 
                                                          
1 WHO, The World Medicines Situations Report of 2011, available at: 
www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/world_medicines_situation/en/; WHO, WORLD BANK 
(2015), Tracking Universal Health Coverage: First Global Monitoring Report, available at: 
http://apps.who.int/iris/ bitstream/10665/174536/1/9789241564977_eng.pdf?ua=1.  
2 GLOBAL COMMISSION ON HIV AND THE LAW, Risks, Rights & Health (2012), available at: 
www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/report. 
3 On global burden of diseases and global health risks see WTO, WIPO, WHO (2013), 
Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation. Intersections between Public Health, 
Intellectual Property and Trade, Geneva, pp. 25-30 (hereafter The Trilateral Study). 
4 National immunization and mandatory vaccines programmes, like the recent one 
enacted by the Italian Government, are a highly effective public health tool for the 
prevention of illness and the spread of infectious diseases. More information available at: 
www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_5.jsp?area=Malattie%20infettive&menu=vaccinazioni. 
5 The Trilateral Study, p. 9. 
6 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 
14. The right to the highest attainable standard of health, Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 of 11 August 
2000. 
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important structural determinant of health7. Many elements and legal and 
policy instruments relating to the IP and international trade system touch 
both on innovation and on access and are therefore relevant at the 
international level. International trade is vital for access to medicines and 
other medical technologies8. At least four of the multilateral trade 
agreements of WTO, the leading normative organization on international 
trade, affect public health in various ways, particularly in areas of safety, 
diagnostic devices and medicine quality, trade in health services, such as 
the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the WTO 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS), the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). In addition, other international health standards and rules have 
important implications for health, for example, the Codex Alimentarius, and 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Geneva, 16 June 2003). 
Nevertheless, this article will focus only on the TRIPS Agreement and its 
patent system. This is because the patent system has been widely used for 
medical technologies by the pharmaceutical sector, that continuously 
stands out in terms of its dependence on patents and protected data against 
unfair commercial use to capture returns to research and development 
(R&D)9.  
The impact of patents on access is a complex area that needs a 
particular focus. At the international level, the debate has centred on the 
                                                          
7 WHO, Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights: Report of the Commission 
on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, 2006 (hereinafter: CIPIH Report); 
M. EL SAID, A. KAPCYNSKI, Access to Medicines: The Role of Intellectual Property Law and Policy, 
Working Paper prepared for the Third Meeting of the Technical Advisory Group of the Global 
Commission on HIV and the Law, 7-9 July 2011, available at: www.hivlawcommission.org; The 
Trilateral Study, pp. 53-86. 
8 Trade stimulates competition, which in turn in principle reduces prices and amplifies 
the range of suppliers. Also tariffs on medicines, pharmaceutical ingredients and medical 
technologies, directly affect their accessibility. Access to foreign trade opportunities can 
create economies of scale to support the costs and uncertainties of medical research and 
product development processes. See The Trilateral Study, p. 14. 
9 Several other elements of the current IP system influence (positively or negatively, 
depending on how it is shaped and implemented) access to existing medicines and 
innovation; for example, trademarks and copyright can also exert monopolistic effects in 
the market that rival those associated with patents and with a far greater duration. The 
combined effects of different IP rights on the cost, distribution, accessibility of medicines 
and health technologies is beyond the scope of this short study that, therefore, will not 
consider other relevant aspects of IP system such as, among others, the relationship 
between trademarks and international non-proprietary names (INN) and copyright 
questions regarding the package insert of medicines. 
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high price of patented medicines used to treat HIV/AIDS. The dramatic story 
of the AIDS/HIV pandemic in late nineties has clearly illustrated how 
patent policy has critical implications for access to essential medicines and 
contributed to the growing recognition that strong patent law applied to 
developing countries could undermine access to essential health care, thus 
compromising the fundamental right to health, particularly when the costs 
have to be borne by patients themselves10. The cost of medicines is and 
remains a critical factor that limits access to health treatments: when a 
course treatment costs twice or more the monthly wage of people, it is 
clearly not affordable. High prices, sometimes prohibitive prices for life-
saving treatments, medicines and health technologies under patent 
protection could be financially unsustainable in both public and private 
sectors, thus leaving too many people without access to the benefits of the 
medical innovations11. High prices do heavily impact on the right to health 
of poor people.  
The fundamental interrelatedness between poverty and the right to 
health has been stressed by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in two 
resolutions on Access to Medicines and on Enhancing capacity-building in 
public health, approved on 30 June 201612, as one of the overreaching 
determinants that hinder the realization of the right of everyone to the 
                                                          
10 E. ’T HOEN, Private Patents and Public Health. Changing Intellectual Property Rules for 
Access to Medicines, Amsterdam, 2016, pp. 3-4.  
11 A recent example is Sofosbuvir, an important breakthrough in the treatment of 
chronic hepatitis C, whose production cost is estimated to be US$ 68-136 for a course of 
treatment. However, the company that holds the patent sells it for up to US$ 84,000. In 
Europe a one-time treatment costs between 48,000 and 96,000 euros. Cancer also is a big 
money maker: global oncology sales by the pharmaceutical industry accounted for US$ 100 
billion in 2015 and, according to a recent study, are expected to rise to US$ 147 billion in 
2018 (see M. HARPER, The Cancer Drug Market Just Hit $100 Billion And Could Jump 50% In 
Four Years, 5 May 2015, Forbes/Pharma & Health Care, available at: www.forbes.com/sites/ 
matthewherper/2015/05/05/cancer- drug-sales-approach-100-billion-and- could-increase-50-by-
2018/). The cancer drug Imatinib (brand name Glivec) also demonstrates the huge 
differences between a monopoly price and a generic price. South Africa pays over US$ 
3,227 per patient per month for the branded product Glivec, while in India where the patent 
was not granted, the drug is priced at US$ 170 for a month’s treatment. In the U.S.A, the 
price of Glivec has nearly tripled since its introduction in 2001 and now costs US$ 92,000 a 
year. See, E. ‘T HOEN, A Victory for Global Public Health in the Indian Supreme Court, in JPHP, 
2013, pp. 370-373. 
12 HRC, Access to medicines in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, res. 32/15, Doc. 
A/HRC/32/L.32/Rev.1 of 1 July 2016; HRC, Promoting the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health through 
enhancing capacity-building in public health, res. 32/16, Doc. A/HRC/32/L.23/Rev.1 of 
1 July 2016. 
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enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
and thus the access to life-saving medicines and healthcare treatments13. 
The argument advanced by brand name global pharmaceutical industries, 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative, developed country 
governments, that the big problem is not patents but poverty is misleading, 
since the current trend to transform medicines and life-saving drugs into 
private commodities for sale at whatever prices permitted by the market, 
through the dramatic expansion of high levels of intellectual property 
protection, has much to do with the reduced access to essential medicines 
to those who need them most14. While, this interrelatedness is beyond the 
scope of this article, there are plenty of evidences that correlates poverty 
with high disease burden: illness can be both a cause and a consequence 
of poverty. Individuals who lack access to essential medicines 
disproportionately live in poor and in low and middle-income countries, or 
live on low incomes in many wealthy countries. Poverty affects purchasing 
power, and the inability of poor people to pay reduces effective demand 
which, in turn, affects the degree of interest of for-profit companies. The 
expense of serious family illness, including drugs, is a major cause of 
household impoverishment. Chronic and catastrophic diseases remain one of the 
main factors that push households from poverty into deprivation, since - in the 
absence of universal healthcare in many countries - most medicines and 
health services are paid out-of-pocket15. According to recent estimates, the 
current increase in health-care costs, that can be exorbitantly costly and 
largely unaffordable for governments, communities, families and 
individuals in both poor and rich countries, as well as the skyrocketing 
                                                          
13 The economic impact of pharmaceuticals is substantial - especially in developing 
countries. Most developed countries spend on pharmaceuticals less than one-fifth of total 
public and private health spending, while health spending in transitional economies 
represents 15 to 30% of the total; by contrast, in most low-income countries 
pharmaceuticals are the largest public expenditure on health (25 to 66%) after personnel 
costs and the largest household health expenditure. See OECD, Focus on Health Spending, 
OECD Health Statistics 2015, July 2015 available at: www.oecd.org/health. 
14 S. K. KELL, Trips-Plus Free Trade Agreement and Access to Medicines, in LLR, 2007, 
(referring to the “poverty non patents line”), pp. 45-47. 
15 Rightly, therefore, res. 32/15 stresses the need of universal health coverage that implies 
that “all people have access without discrimination to nationally determined sets of the 
needed promotive, preventive, curative, palliative, and rehabilitative essential health 
services, and essential, safe, affordable, efficacious, and quality medicines and vaccines, 
while ensuring that the use of these services does not expose users to financial hardship, 
with a special emphasis on the poor, vulnerable, and marginalized segments of the 
population”. 
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prices for life-saving medicines, vaccines and treatment for rare diseases, 
push 150 million people into impoverishment every year16.  
The evolution of multilateral debate over the past decade has also 
recognized that innovation and access are strictly intertwined; access 
without innovation would simply mean a declining capacity to meet an 
evolving global disease burden. As declared by the US delegate to WTO 
“there can be no access to drugs that have not been developed”17. Patents, 
in principle, promote innovation by providing incentive to invest in R&D. 
Nearly every important medicine of the last century-and-a-half, including 
antibiotics, vaccines, HIV treatments, cancer and cardiovascular medicines, 
owes its existence to the R&D activities of the (biotech)pharmaceutical 
industry. Yet, the role of intellectual property right (IPR) rules in innovation 
and how to enhance their effectiveness are matters of continuing debate18. 
The current way to finance and make available important pharmaceutical 
innovations begs the question whether the patent system, globalised 
through the WTO TRIPS Agreement, is really the most efficient way to go 
about it; or if is it possible to design a different system, aimed at stimulating 
pharmaceutical innovation that all can afford.  
An important factor that hinders innovation and access to (essential) 
medicines and medical innovation is in fact the lack of sufficient 
investments in R&D in important public health needs. Under the prevailing 
IP model, pharmaceutical and biomedical industry recoups the costs of its 
R&D through high drug prices protected by patents monopolies and data 
and market exclusivities. The result of such market-oriented and profit-
driven innovation approach is that very rarely new health technologies are 
developed for health conditions which cannot deliver back high return 
profits or sufficient return on investment. This is, for example, the case for 
bacterial infections that require antibiotics. Multi-drug resistant (MDR) 
Gram-negative bacteria are one of the major risks to modern medicine; 
notwithstanding the fact that most antibiotics, with the exception of the 
most recent ones, are off patent, every new antibiotic has proven 
exponentially much more expensive than its predecessors and has not 
attracted much investments in research, since it typically offers little 
                                                          
16 The Lancet Editorial: Reducing the Cost of Rare Disease Drugs, in The Lancet, 2011, p. 746. 
17 WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 8-9 
November 2016, Discussion of the UN High-Level Panel Report on Access to Medicines, 
available at: www.wto.org/english/news16_e/trips_08nov16_e.htm. 
18 A.D. SO, C. OH., Approaches to Intellectual Property and Innovation That Meet the Public 
Health Challenge of AIDS. Working Paper prepared for the Third Meeting of the Technical 
Advisory Group of the Global Commission on HIV and the Law, 7-9 July 2011. 
 7 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 22/2017 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
pecuniary reward for year of costly research19. Secondly, medical 
innovation has historically failed to address major diseases that are endemic 
in the developing and least developed world. At present, most research and 
development for medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and related health 
technologies are based on financial potential rather than the needs of the 
poorest and most marginalized communities. Rare and neglected diseases 
that affect disproportionally small and poor proportions of populations 
have not traditionally attracted enough investments. Despite the fact that 
neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) count for approximately 12% of total 
disease burden, only 4% of therapeutic products for these diseases has been 
registered in the last decade20. This situation can easily be explained by the 
low purchase power of people disproportionally affected by such diseases. 
The recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa, which killed more than 11,000 
people, and the highly infectious Zika virus, spreading far and fast, with 
devastating consequences being linked with microcephaly, also highlight 
how the lack of incentives for research and development resulted in the 
absence of effective health technologies available to respond to these public 
emergencies of international concern21. Finally, paediatric formulations for 
diseases that affect children also remain scarce22.  
To sum up, also the current patent-based incentive model for R&D 
has led to systematic underinvestment in diseases that do not represent a 
                                                          
19 CENTER FOR DISEASE DYNAMICS, ECONOMICS AND POLICY, The State of the World’s 
Antibiotics (2015), Washington, available at: http://cddep.org/about_cddep; The Review on 
Antimicrobial Resistance (2016), Tackling Drug Resistant Infections Globally: Final Report and 
Recommendations, available at: http://amr-review.org/sites/default/files/160518_Final%20 
paper_with%20cover.pdf. According to the CIPIH Report, p. 109, even if a new antibiotic may 
itself cost significantly more than its predecessors, still the overall cost of treatment may 
make economic and financial sense because the treatment time is shorter, compliance better 
and less overall ancillary health services are requested, provided that the price for new 
drugs keeps pace with evolving disease burden, improves public health and remains 
affordable (with robust governmental incentives and new business models).  
20 B. PEDRIQUE, N. STRUB-WOURGAFT, C. SOME, P. OLLIARO, P. TROUILLER, N. FORD, B. 
PÉCOUL, J.-H. BRADOL (2013), The Drug and Vaccine Landscape for N eglected Diseases (2000-
11): A Systematic Assessment, in LGH, pp. 37, 379. 
21 S. MOON, D. SRIDHAR, M.A. PATE, A.K. JHA , C. CLINTON, S. DELAUNAY, V. EDWIN, M. 
FALLAH, D.P. FIDLER L. GARRETT, E. GOOSBY, L.O.GOSTIN, D.L. HEYMANN, K. LEE, G.M. 
LEUNG, J.S. MORRISON, J. SAAVEDRA, M. TANNER, J.A. LEIGH, B. HAWKINS, L.R. WOSKIE. P. 
PIOT, Will Ebola Change the Game? Ten Essential Reforms before the N ext Pandemic. The 
Report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, in The Lancet, 
2015, pp. 2204-2221. See also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) 
(2016), 2014 Ebola O utbreak in West Africa - Case C ounts, available at: www.cdc. 
gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case -counts.html. 
22 UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board, Thirty-Fifth Meeting, 9-11 December 2014, 
Agenda item 6: Gap analysis on paediatric HIV treatment, care and support, Geneva. 
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profitable market, such as: diseases that disproportionately affect people 
with little or no ability to pay (so-called “Type II and III”)23; diseases for 
which markets are fragmented or small; and diseases for which the 
treatments need to be preserved and that cannot be aggressively marketed, 
such as antibiotics.  
Coping with all these difficulties means finding new ways of 
supporting innovation and wider access, including rational selection and 
use of medicines; affordable prices; reliable health and supply systems; new 
incentives for R&D of drugs and health technologies and, finally, a IP regime 
for pharmaceutical products able to ensure that all people receive the 
quality and essential health services they need.  
 
 
2 - The actual and/or potential between the rights of inventors, 
international human rights law, trade rules and public health. The 
everlasting controversy on the allegedly adverse impact of IP protection 
on access to medicines and health technologies 
 
All the above mentioned concerns about the patent’s role on access and 
innovation in the context of health technologies, along with the necessity to 
strike a right balance between the duty to fulfil both international 
obligations in the TRIPS Agreement and in international human rights law, 
have repeatedly reaffirmed in the last two decades by several UN political 
and expert bodies24. As said above, in 2016, the United Nations HRC 
                                                          
23 According to the WHO (CIPIH Report, p. 85), there is no evidence that the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in developing countries has significantly boosted 
R&D in pharmaceuticals on Type II (such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis; both diseases 
are present in rich and poor countries, but more than 90% of cases are in the poor 
countries) and particularly Type III diseases (that are overwhelmingly or exclusively 
incident in the developing countries, such as African sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) 
and African river blindness). Type II diseases are often termed neglected diseases and Type 
III diseases very neglected diseases. For these kind of diseases, insufficient market incentives 
are the decisive factor. Development and innovation in respect of these kind of diseases 
normally imply significant involvement by the public sector or philanthropic 
organizations and funding . 
24 Sub-Commission on Human Rights res. 2000/7, Intellectual Property Rights and Human 
Rights, 17 August 2000 (adopted without a vote); Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, res. 2001/21, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights 
(adopted without a vote), Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/L.11/ Add.2 of 16 August 2001; 
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner, The Impact of the Trade 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 of 27 June 2001, paras 11-12; Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 5th WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancun, Mexico, 10-14 September 2003, 
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adopted two important resolutions on access to medicines and on 
enhancing capacity-building in public health, reaffirming that both are 
fundamental elements for achieving the full realization of the right to 
health25. The resolutions have been proposed by a number of developing 
countries, many of which not even member States of the HRC. These 
countries - supported by a high number of additional co-sponsors - have 
again chosen the UN fora to raise the relation between intellectual property 
rights, trade agreements and access issues. The Council took note of the 
actual or potential conflicts that exist between the implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights “ in relation to, inter alia, restrictions on access to patented 
pharmaceuticals and the implications for the enjoyment of the right to 
health”. While intellectual property rights have the important function of 
providing incentives for innovation, they can, in some cases, obstruct access 
by pushing up the price of medicines. HRC res. 32/15 expressly recognizes 
“that the protection of intellectual property is important for the 
development of new medicines” but it also expressed its “concerns about its 
effects on prices”.  
The finding that there are actual and potential conflicts between the 
WTO’s implementation of the agreement on TRIPS and the realization of 
the right to health, came after some authoritative conclusions reached in 
2012 by the Global Commission on HIV and the Law (an independent body 
of eminent persons tasked by the Programme Coordinating Board of the 
Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS) that a growing body of international 
                                                          
Human Rights and Trade; Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur, 
Paul Hunt, on The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of 
Physical and Mental Health, 1 March 2004, Doc. E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1 of 1 March 2004; 
HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Anand Grover, on The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment 
of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Doc. A/HRC/11/12 of 31 
March 2009; HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Expert Consultation on Access to 
Medicines as a Fundamental Component of the Right to Health, Doc. A/HRC/17/43 of 16 March 
2011; HRC, The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical 
and Mental Health in the Context of Development and Access to Medicines, res. 17/14, Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/17/14 of 14 July 2011; Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, 
The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, Human Rights 
Council, Doc. A/HRC/20/26 of 14 May 2012, para. 59; HRC, Access to medicines in the 
context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health, res. 23/14, Doc. AHRC/23/L.10/Rev.1 of 11 June 2013, (adopted by a 
vote of 31 in favor to 0 against, with 16 abstentions); Patent policy and the human right to 
science and culture, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Doc. 
A/70/279 of 4 August 2015, para. 4. 
25 HRC, res. 32/15 and res. 32/16, supra, note 12. 
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trade law is hindering the right to health of millions and that new solutions 
are needed to incentivize innovation and increase access to treatment26. 
Consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Global 
Commission, and in line with his synthesis report on the post-2015 
development agenda and the recently adopted Sustainable Development 
Goals, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon convened in 
November 2015 a High-Level Panel on innovation and access to health 
technologies (hereafter HLP). Again, the HLP’s terms of reference called for 
it to  
 
“review and assess proposals and recommend solutions for 
remedying the policy incoherence between the justifiable rights of 
inventors, international human rights law, trade rules and public 
health in the context of health technologies”.  
 
In order to significantly improve innovation and access to medicines, 
vaccines, diagnostics, and related health technologies across the world, the 
Panel has therefore been tasked with proposing solutions to address the 
misalignment between these three different and overlapping spheres. The 
HLP realised its final report, which contains a lot of important findings and 
recommendations, in September 201627. A key aspect of the HLP report, a 
vision interestingly shared also with the Secretariat of WTO28, is the necessity 
to encourage “coherence” for public health at all levels. According to the 
Panel, the main reason for the actual policy incoherencies derives from the 
fact that policies that have a bearing on access to health technologies and 
that are associated with trade, intellectual property, health and human 
rights  
 
“were developed with different objectives and at different periods in 
history. Each is governed by its own legal and regulatory regime and 
each imposes obligations that may not align with the others. Trade 
and intellectual property rules were not developed with the goal of 
protecting the right to health, just as human rights doctrine does not 
primarily concern itself with promoting trade or reducing tariffs. 
Policy incoherencies arise when legitimate economic, social and 
                                                          
26 GLOBAL COMMISSION ON HIV AND THE LAW, Risks, Rights and Health (2012), Executive 
Summary, pp. 14-16. 
27 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines. 
Promoting innovation and access to health technologies, September 2016 (hereafter HLP Report), 
available at: www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/.  
28 See UN SECRETARY GENERAL’S HIGH LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES, Building 
Momentum for the Coherence Agenda on Global Health, Background note prepared by the 
Secretariat of the WTO, available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00c1a 
3ef761/t/5716611627d4bd3a483b70a4/1461084438964/1603+HLP+WTO+background+paper+su 
bmitted.pdf. 
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political interests and priorities are misaligned or in conflict with the 
right to health”. 
 
Another critical element is the diverse accountability mechanisms 
and transparency levels of the three different areas (on the one side, human 
rights and public health characterized by vary and very often limited legal 
weight and enforceability; on the other side, the intellectual property-
related accountability mechanism, very effectively regulated by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body, as well as by strong dispute settlement provisions 
found in free trade and investment agreement). Finally, according to the HLP 
key aspects of policy, incoherencies lie in the misalignment between market-
based models for innovation and the need to obtain treatment for patients29.  
The conclusions reached by the HLP on these types of specialized 
legal norms and institutions, that have developed largely independently 
from one another, in response to specific functional issues, that come with 
their own principles, their own forms of expertise and own “ethos”, are 
confirmed by the harsh and vigorous debate that has opposed in the last 
two decades, on the one side, an alliance of developing and least developed 
countries, non-governmental organizations and UN Human rights bodies 
campaigning for access to essential medicines and, on the other - opposite - 
side, the pharmaceutical industry and developed countries. Both groups 
defend two very different perspectives and views of patents rights and their 
impact on the human right to health30. The tensions between these two 
reasoning schemas reflect themselves, also, in different interpretation of 
many of the TRIPS provisions, whose language is sufficiently ambiguous to 
sometimes support both competing patent perspectives. The first 
perspective, shared by the international human rights community, is based 
on the assumption that patents are simply “privileges” inherently subject to 
limitations and exceptions. This is the idea constantly supported by the UN 
Human Rights Bodies that have extensively clarified the fundamental 
nature of the right to health and access to medicines and health 
technologies31, as affirmed (by States themselves) in numerous treaties and 
declarations, including the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR, New York, 16 December 1966, Article 12), the WHO Constitution, 
as well as in many regional human rights instruments and many national 
constitutions32. This hard law is also supplemented by soft law norms 
                                                          
29 HLP Report, p. 16. 
30 C.M. HO, Global Access to Medicine: The Influence of Competing Patent Perspectives, in 
FILJ, 2016, pp. 29-39. 
31 Supra, note 24.  
32 R. ELLIOTT, Background Paper: International legal norms: the right to health and the 
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which include non-binding instruments adopted by States, such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (Target 8.E of Millennium Development 
Goals 8) and Sustainable Development Goal 3 of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, adopted in September 2015 by 193 member States 
of the United Nations, with the aim to “Ensure healthy lives and promote 
well-being for all at all ages”, including a bold commitment to end the 
epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other communicable diseases, 
to achieve universal health coverage, and provide access to safe, effective 
and affordable medicines and vaccines for all by 2030. 
Human rights law, while recognizing that the full achievement of the 
right to health is a legal obligation of progressive realization33, also poses the 
strong presumption that “retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right 
to health are not permissible”, and constitute a violation of the right to 
health34. A conclusion, this, of particular relevance to the adoption by States 
of IP provisions, especially in respect of the core minimum obligations of the 
right to health that are deemed “non-derogable” and immediately binding on 
States, like ensuring the right to access to health technologies and essential 
medicines35.  
The right to health is completed by the right of everyone (codified in 
ICESCR, Article 15.1 (b)) “to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications”36. As to the question whether intellectual property rights are 
themselves human rights, undoubtedly both the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Articles 17 and 27) and the ICESCR (Article 15.1) recognize 
the right to property and the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from artistic and scientific works. Nevertheless, 
at the heart of the debate lies a complex distinction between individual 
intellectual property rights and community rights37. In a General Comment 
                                                          
justifiable rights of inventors, available at: www.unsgaccessmeds.org/new-page/. 
33 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 cit., para. 31. 
34 CESCR, Human rights and intellectual property: Statement by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001), para. 13.  
35 CESCR, General Comment No. 3, The Nature of States Parties Obligations, Doc. E/1991/23 
of 14 December 1990, para. 10; CESCR, General Comment No. 14, para. 43(a), (d), (e); United 
Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, Core Human Rights in the Two 
Covenants, September 2013. 
36 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights: The Right to Enjoy the 
Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, Doc. A/HRC/20/26 of 14 May 2012, at 
paras 9-12; UNGA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food: Seed Policies and the 
Right to Food: Enhancing Agrobiodiversity and Encouraging Innovation, Doc. A/64/170 of 23 
July 2009; R. ELLIOTT, Background Paper, supra, note 32, pp. 9-11. 
37 For an important discussion on this point see Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Discussion paper submitted by A.R. 
CHAPMAN to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Doc. 
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on the normative content of the ICESCR provision38, the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter: the Committee or 
CESCR) importantly noted that the right of “authors” to benefit from the 
protection of moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic productions, refers exclusively to natural persons. The 
implication of the General Comment is that there is no human right of 
companies to any particular form of protection for the legal rights which 
result from a patented invention: the entitlements of legal entities under 
intellectual property treaties are not protected at the level of human rights39. 
According to the Committee, there is a fundamental distinction between the 
human rights of inventors (which derives from the inherent dignity and worth 
of all persons) and the legal rights related to intellectual property. Human 
rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements belonging to 
individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of individuals and 
communities  
 
“whereas intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by 
which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and 
creativity, encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative 
productions, as well as the development of cultural identities, and 
preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for 
the benefit of society as a whole”. 
 
In contrast to human rights that are fundamental, universal entitlements 
that people inherently acquire by virtue of their birth, 
 
 “intellectual property rights are one policy tool among many for 
encouraging innovation and technological research and development 
(…) and are generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, 
licensed or assigned to someone else”40. 
 
All the above commentaries and interpretations clearly support the 
idea of patents as a “privilege” that primarily protect business and 
                                                          
E/C.12/2000/12 of 3 October 2000, paras 23-28; M. DUNCAN, Intellectual Property Rights, 
Human Rights and the Right to Health, in W. GROSHEIDE (ed.), Intellectual Property Rights and 
Human Rights: A Paradox, Cheltenam-Northampton, 2010, pp.118-140.  
38 CESCR, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the 
Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of 
Which He or She Is the Author (article 15, paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 
of January 2006. 
39 On the very different approach of the European Court of Human Rights on this isssue, 
see H.A.M. WINFRIED, Corporations and the European Convention on Human Rights, available 
at: www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/Conferences/GlobeJune2012_Corporationsandthe.pdf, pp. 43-
68. 
40 Supra, note 38, para. 10. 
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corporate interests and investments; as such, it must be subject to 
limitations and exceptions in the public interest and yield to the right to 
public health whenever in contrast and/or in potential conflict with this 
fundamental human right and societal interests, such as low-cost access to 
medicines.  
It is a shared view in the human rights community that the today’s 
IP system, particularly within the area of pharmaceutical innovation, is “out 
of balance”. The far most important barrier to access is deemed strong 
intellectual property protection that leads to high prices and limited access, 
due to the reduced quantity and availability of quality generic alternatives. 
Patents are believed to provide excessive financial rewards to patent 
holders, mostly large pharmaceutical companies, by allowing patent 
holders to use the de facto monopoly created by the patent to ask the highest 
possible price for their products, thus excluding from access those who 
cannot pay and preventing competition. Being affordable prices a critical 
determinant of access to (essential) medicines, generic competition is 
considered a key factor, among others, in driving prices down. An example 
may be found in the context of the AIDS/HIV pandemic when the ground 
reality drastically changed only by the competition brought about by 
generics industry that had played a significant role in pushing down the 
prices of off-patent products thus allowing nearly 15 million people to be 
on treatment41.  
While prices of medicines and health technologies are influenced by 
a large variety of factors42, undoubtedly intellectual property rules play a 
                                                          
41 The fact that patent allows per se to maintain monopolistic prices is currently a strong 
concern in respect to the second- and third-line of antiretroviral drugs, whose costs remain 
significantly higher than that of the first-line antiretroviral drugs in developing countries. 
Access to these new antiretroviral drugs is critical for patients in developing countries who 
fail to benefit from first-line therapies and who have developed resistance to the first-line 
treatment. Similarly, the costs of of new cancer medications have raised in the last decade 
at such a higher rate to make healthcare unaffordable even for health systems and 
individuals in high-income countries. See E. ‘T HOEN, (2016), supra, note 10, p. 4; E. ‘T HOEN, 
The Global Politics of Pharmaceutical Monopoly Power. Drug Patents, Access, Innovation and the 
Application of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, The Netherlands, p. 5; 
T. FOJO, C. GRADY, How Much is Life Worth: Cetuximab, Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer, and the 
$440 Billion Question, in JNCI, 2009, pp.1044-1048; HLP Report, p. 21. 
42 A number of approaches and global policies may be adopted to ensuring that the 
prices of drugs and other products are as affordable as possible. Governments may 
employ direct price controls, reference pricing, and reimbursement limits; or resort to other 
different means including removing tariffs and taxes and regulating supply chain 
distribution mark-ups. Differential pricing applied by pharmaceutical companies can be 
also a complementary tool to increase access, by linking prices to the differing capacity to 
pay according to income levels within distinct markets. Another strategy for enhanced 
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role since the patents protection required by the TRIPS Agreement has 
brought to monopolistic prices, not justifiable to compensate for the real 
costs of R&D43. Patent-owing companies are also frequently criticized for 
spending much more money on the advertisement and promotion of drugs 
than on scientific research, especially in respect of inadequate research and 
development for the so-called “medicines for the poor”. Another area of 
strong concern is the peril of market economic concentration of global 
pharmaceutical firms and their political powerfulness on the western 
countries’ trade policymaking context in order to systematically obtain 
higher levels of protection through a number of venues44. Further, human 
rights activists and academics have recurrently outlined various forms of 
patent abuses of monopoly; the majority of current pharmaceutical patents 
are on drugs that had only been slightly changed, namely a “new form” not 
new molecules; yet both categories are currently being patented, needlessly 
making them more costly45. Other examples of abuses are the so-called 
“evergreen” patents that occur in regard of no incremental therapeutic 
values (for example when companies file and obtain patent, subsequent the 
original patent, for different dosage forms)46. Much emphasis has also been 
put on the bullying role of pharmaceutical firms, the US, and the EU trade 
                                                          
access to medicines consists in developing local production capacity and leveraging 
technology transfer. See CIPIH Report, p. 109. 
43 Drug discovery and development is a complex, lengthy and costly activity. Widely 
quoted figures for a sample of medicines suggest that the average cost of developing a new 
drug is US$ 800 million, or even much more. This sum supposedly includes the cost of 
capital, success and failure, but it has been questioned on methodological grounds and 
because the raw data for independent verification are not available. However, evidences 
show that the direct costs of developing a particular drug are much lower depending upon 
the therapeutic area, geographical focus and regulatory requirements. This is particularly 
true for products developed by public-private partnerships or because of prior investment 
in discovery research in universities and public research institutions. See, CIPIH Report, p. 
17; on high prices that do not necessarily indicate essential innovation, see also E. ‘T HOEN 
(2016), pp. 126- 129.  
44 P. DRAHOS, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Owners and 
Thier Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, in CWRJIL, 2004, pp. 55-61.  
45 Only 15 % of new drugs - approved by the United States Food and Drug 
Administration from 1989 to 2000 - was for highly innovative priority new medical entities. 
Medicines were thus insensibly modified, and thereafter patented. See NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, 
Washington, D.C., Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, May 2002, p. 3, available 
at: nihcm.org/pdf/innovations.pdf. 
46 The CIPIH (CIPIH Report 2006, p. 134) defined evergreening as a term “popularly used 
to describe patenting strategies when, in the absence of any apparent addition therapeutic 
benefits, patent holders use various strategies to extend the length of their exclusivity 
beyond the 20-years patent term”.  
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policies with respect to the intellectual property and access to essential 
medicines in developing countries, particularly on the deceiving EU’s 
attitude to handle generic medicines transiting the EU territory47.  
Last, but not least, there is a very rich literature concerning the 
current worldwide trend for countries to enter into economic integration 
arrangements in various bilateral and regional configurations (regional 
trade agreements (RTAs), free trade agreements (FTAs), bilateral trade 
agreements (BTAs), or preferential trade agreements (PTAs)) - a 
development that is presenting significant systemic challenges for the 
multilateral system. As recently noted by the WTO, WIPO and WHO, these 
trade agreements have frequently taken the form of deep integration 
processes that include provisions on a wide range of regulatory policy 
areas, such as services and IP, imposing important changes in national laws, 
which directly affect the framework governing access to, and innovation in, 
medicines and medical technologies48. It is widely recognized that these 
trade agreements have progressively expanded and deepened patent and 
data protection on medicines and health technologies, further 
exacerbating policy incoherencies between the obligation of States to 
protect and enforce intellectual property rights (usually backed by a very 
powerful investor-State disputes) and their corresponding human rights 
obligations and public health priorities49. A number of provisions found 
in these trade agreements are labelled TRIPS-Plus provisions because 
they exceed the minimum standards for protection and enforcement 
required by the TRIPS Agreement and limit its inherent flexibilities in the 
TRIPS Agreement (or TRIPS-Minus insofar these provisions simply omit 
any TRIPS flexibilities). The most common examples are TRIPS-Plus 
demands that regularly figure on the list of the US and/or the EU trade 
talks and that delay the introduction of generic medicines in the market, 
such as: patent for new uses or methods of using known products; patent 
linkage; test data exclusivity periods; extension of patent terms for 
pharmaceuticals beyond the 20 years required by TRIPS Agreement for 
“unreasonable” regulatory or marketing delays; restrictions for 
compulsory licences and for parallel importation; prohibition of pre-
grant or post-grant patent opposition; enhanced obligations regarding 
border measures, civil and administrative procedure, remedial 
provisions and the criminalization of certain violations beyond what is 
                                                          
47 See infra note 100. In addition, see WHO, CIPIH Report, Main recommendations, BWHO, 
2006, p. 351; C. CORREA, The Commission on IPRs, Innovation and Public Health. A Critique, in 
South Bulletin, 15 April 2006, available at: http://www.southcentre.org.  
48 The Trilateral Study, pp. 83-85. 
49 HLP Report, pp. 9-10. 
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required by the TRIPS Agreement50. Asymmetries of power between 
powerful and poor countries, between corporation and citizens, fuel this 
awful trend, making difficult for developing countries to push back on 
TRIPS-Plus demands in bilateral or regional talks, or making harder for 
them to resist signing similar trade in future deals. In this respect, greater 
transparency and greater involvement of the health community, till now 
excluded from participation in these trade agreements, would greatly 
contribute solving the problem. Transparency is actually a recurring theme 
throughout the final HLP Report, that was very critical about the lack of 
transparency, surrounding - not only the costs of R&D, production, 
marketing, distribution and the end prices of health technologies51 - but also 
bilateral and regional Free Trade and Investment Agreements, that are often 
negotiated in secrecy. A paradigm shift in transparency, a core component of 
good governance, would certainly provide a robust and effective 
accountability framework needed to hold all stakeholders responsible for 
the impact of their actions on innovation and access52.  
The alternative perspective on patents lies on a very different “ethos” 
- a sort of uber-right schema53 - that is defended by several western countries 
(home to big pharmaceutical companies) and by the same pharmaceutical 
companies; both strongly object both the wording of the HRC resolutions 
(although supportive of the overall goal of the resolution) and the 
recommendations contained in the above mentioned UN HLP Report. In 
various statements delivered in a general comment on the draft UN 
resolutions, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the European Union, 
defined the recent UN resolutions unbalanced, due to an undue emphasis 
on the access to medicines and an inadequate simplification of the issue54. 
                                                          
50 See, for all, HLP Report, pp. 24-26. On the challenges faced by some developing 
(medicines producing and exporting) countries such as India, Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia, 
South Africa and Kenya see, E. ‘T HOEN (2009), supra note 41, pp. 44-62.  
51 See also R.F. BEALL, A. ATTARAN, Which Patent and Where? Why International Patent 
Transparency by Companies is Needed for Medicines, in NB, 2016, pp. 923-926. 
52 See the section on “Governance, Accountability and Transparency” in the HLP Report, 
pp. 33.36. 
53 See C. M. HO, supra, note 30, pp. 34-49. 
54 Earlier, during informal consultations, the Netherlands, speaking for EU, wanted 
reference to ‘generics’ removed altogether and to replace the word “full” use of TRIPS 
flexibilities with “appropriate” use of TRIPS flexibilities, thus watering down the language. 
Those suggestions, fortunately, were not accepted and retained in the final text of res. 
32/15. Mexico noted that it was extremely important to adopt all measures on economic, 
social and cultural rights in order to allow everyone to access the highest attainable health 
services, but that it was unacceptable to include into the resolution references to trade 
aspects and intellectual property rights, since the Council could not be used to establish 
precedents regarding human rights and international trade and intellectual property 
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On their part, the pharmaceutical industry released statements showing 
great disappointment in respect of the recent HLP recommendations, for 
having ignored the most common issues that hamper access to medicines 
and failed to recognize the complexity of the issue, as well as the many 
existing and innovative efforts already taking place to advance access to 
care in the last two decades55. According to the Biotechnology Innovation 
Organization (BIO), IP simply could not restrict access to medicines because 
the vast majority of essential medicines are no longer under patent56. The 
key to the success of the biotechnology industry is a business model based on 
making significant investments (often hundreds of millions of dollars) in 
early stage research and development with the hope that some of these 
investments and efforts will yield a commercial product.  
This model has worked despite the fact that it is lengthy (often taking 
more than a decade) and that most biotechnology R&D investments and 
efforts do not result in a commercial product reaching the market57. All 
opponents stressed that both the HRC resolutions and the HLP mandates 
were too narrow since they did not analysed other important factors 
unrelated to IP that stand in the way of access to medicines, such as those 
outlined in the 2013 joint WHO-WTO-WIPO Trilateral Study, which 
include: inequalities between and within countries, poverty, tariffs and 
taxes on imported medicines or other barriers that can result in 
“unaffordability”, inefficient and inconsistent regulatory systems, 
inadequate transportation infrastructure, deficient distribution systems, a 
shortage of trained healthcare providers and facilities, corruption, to name 
a few58. Further, they objected that there is plain evidence that countries 
with little or no IP protections, or countries with a focus on generic medicines, 
still face significant challenges in providing much needed medicines to their 
                                                          
instruments. Statements released are available at: www.ip-watch.org/2016/07/01/access-to-
medicines-resolution-adopted-by-un-human-rights-council/; www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pa 
ges/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20223&LangID=E. 
55 Available at: www.ip-watch.org/2016/09/14/un-high-level-panel-on-access-to-
medicines-issues-landmark-report/; see also HLP Report, A. Witty’s Commentary, p. 56.  
56 According to a recent survey, the vast majority of the medicines on the WHO 
Essential Medicines List are not patented. For the 2015 list, that contains 409 medicines, 
only around 34 (8%) have been patented. A conclusion this that for big Pharma companies 
hardly provides the empirical evidence needed to justify reinventing the patent system that 
incentivized these drugs into existence. Additionally, LDCs are not required to introduce 
patents for any medicines before the year 2033 and few of those 34 medicines are patented 
in many other poorer countries. 
57 L. FEISEE, Comments of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), available at: 
www.unsgaccessmeds.org/inbox/2016/2/28/the-biotechnology-innovation-organization. See also 
the counter-argument advanced by the CIPIH Report, supra, note 42,  
58 The Trilateral Study, p. 156 ff. 
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populations, since the availability of a medicine in a country even at the 
lowest possible prices, does not guarantee that the patient population in 
need of the medicine will actually be able to access it. The final implication 
is that even if patents were abolished tomorrow, it would make little 
difference to the cost or availability of most medicines used in developing 
countries.  
This means that IP plays no role in the lack of access for these 
medicines and these countries59, while, weak and unpredictable IP laws in 
countries create a difficult, if not impossible environment, for the 
development of new medicines, and for providing the incentives necessary 
to introduce new and innovative medicines for populations that need them. 
Therefore, contrary to the “incoherence” described by the HRC and the 
HLP, the relationship between patents and medicines is (logically) quite the 
opposite: strong intellectual property rights are essential for robust medical 
innovation, which heavily rely on patent protections to generate investment 
into the development of these products. Rather than condemning 
intellectual property rights as the principle barrier to access, the incentives 
to innovate must be protected, not abandoned. This implies the necessity to 
strengthen IP laws to enable investors, companies and researchers to take 
the risks necessary to develop innovative medicines to reach those who 
need them most60. 
 
 
3 - Are human rights and intellectual property law really in conflict? A 
relation of interpretation, not of conflict 
 
The two very different “ethos” and competing patent perspectives 
illustrated above, clearly bring the international lawyers to the topic of 
“fragmentation” and diversification of public international law that has 
been the subject of much scholarly attention over the last decade. In its 
seminal study on the “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law”, a 
Study Group of the International Law Commission (ILC), chaired by Martti 
Koskenniemi, reviewed the legal techniques to deal with situations in 
which multiple international norms co-exist, in relationships either of 
interpretation or conflict61. The techniques suggested to solve 
                                                          
59 HLP Report, A. WITTY’s Commentary, p. 56. 
60 Ibidem.  
61 ILC Conclusions 2006. ILC, Report of the Study Group, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Conclusions, 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 of 18 July 2006. 
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hypothetical/prima facie or actual normative conflicts seek, first, to ascertain 
the common intention of States parties to the relevant regimes and include 
the principle of harmonization-systemic integration as a generally accepted 
principle: when several norms bear on a single issue, they should, to the 
extent possible, be interpreted in an integrated and harmonized way. In 
certain situations, generally accepted techniques of interpretation and 
conflict resolution consist in the priority of particular or special norms (lex 
specialis) over general norms and the priority of a subsequent rule (lex 
posterior) replacing an earlier conflicting rule. Another priority relates to 
“Relations of Importance”, based on the idea that while there is no formal 
constitution in international law and no general order of precedence 
between international legal rules, nevertheless some norms are more 
important than others because they secure important interests or protect 
fundamental values. Therefore in case of conflict they enjoy a superior 
position, including: jus cogens obligations, obligations erga omnes and Article 
103 of the UN Charter. The well-known conclusions reached by the Report 
are the follows: International law is a legal system and its rules and 
principles should be interpreted against the background of other rules and 
principles; in applying international law, it is often necessary to determine 
the precise relationship between two or more rules and principles that are 
both valid and applicable in respect of a situation. For that purpose, the 
relevant relationships fall generally into two general types: a) 
“Relationships of interpretation”, which is the case where one norm assists 
in the interpretation of another as an application, clarification, updating or 
modification of the latter. In such a situation, both norms are applied in 
conjunction; b) “Relationships of conflict”, that is the case where two norms 
that are both valid and applicable point to incompatible decisions, so that a 
choice must be made between them (the basic rules concerning the 
resolution of normative conflicts are to be found in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, especially in the light of the provisions 
in Articles 31-33).  
It is the Author’s opinion that the normative relationship between 
the justifiable rights of inventors, international human rights law, trade 
rules and public health in the context of health technologies is not one of 
conflict; a conclusion this that seems valid even adopting a wide and loose 
understanding of notion of conflict, as “a situation where two rules or 
principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem”, and not a 
narrow notion of conflict as incompatibility between the different sets of 
rules, so that it is impossible for a party to two or more treaties to comply 
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with one rule without failing to comply with another rule or obligation62. 
Many of the so-called actual or potential conflicts between different 
legislatives policies can be resolved simply through a correct legal 
reasoning and interpretation of the rules in question (especially the TRIPS 
rules),  
 
“by applying the general rules codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention, 
which mandate that treaty interpretation must be based on the text, 
context, object and purpose and good faith, to be used as one holistic 
rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate test to be 
applied in a hierarchical order”63.  
 
The starting point of the reasoning is that the WTO system is not a closed 
system, a position clearly rejected by the Appellate Body when it noted that 
WTO Agreements “should not be read in clinical isolation from public 
international law”64, referring further to “additional interpretative 
guidance, as general principles of international law”65, and that “such 
international law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do 
not ‘contract out’ from it”66. Contrary to the current assertions in many 
human rights discourses, the WTO system has not at all contracted out 
human rights concerns in respect of public health. Rather it has clearly 
internalized public health considerations into its TRIPS Agreement, and 
further enhanced them during the fourth Ministerial conference in Doha in 
2001 via the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health67. 
In order to determine whether or not Section 5 of Part II of the TRIPS 
Agreement (which sets out the obligations of members with respect to 
standards concerning the availability, scope, use of patents) really prevents 
a sound balancing of incentives for R&D of new drugs with the interest of 
patients (making these medicines as widely accessible as possible), it is 
necessary to analyze very briefly the main features of the TRIPS provisions 
                                                          
62 Report of the Study Group of the ILC, finalized by M. KOSKENNIEMI, Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 
of 13 April 2006, p.19. See also J. PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law. 
How WTO Relates to Other Rules of International Law, Cambridge, 2003, pp.146-200. 
63 WTO, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, Doc. 
WT/DS152/R of 22 December 1999, para. 7.22. 
64 WTO, United States - Standards of Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the 
Appellate Body, Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R of 29 April 1996, p. 17. 
65 WTO Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R of 12 October 1998, para. 158. 
66 WTO, Korea - Measures Affecting Government Procurement, Report of the Panel, Doc. 
WT/DS163/R of 1 May 2000, para. 7.96. 
67 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Ministerial Conference, Fourth 
Session (Doha, 9-14 November 2001), Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 of 14 November 2001, 
available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm.  
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on patents, the Doha Declaration, as well as the patent system’s primary 
regulatory purpose. The rationale and the social purpose of patent protection 
is to provide an incentive for technological change and in particular for 
further investments into R&D in order to make new inventions. The patent 
system intends to correct the “market failure” by providing innovators with 
limited exclusive rights to prevent others from exploiting their invention, 
thereby enabling the innovators to appropriate returns on their innovation 
activities68. Absent patent protection, there may be insufficient incentives to 
invent (i.e. to invest in R&D) and to innovate, because others cannot be 
excluded from appropriating the benefits without sharing the costs. If it is 
true that the immediate goal is to incentivize and reward innovation, this is 
not the patent system’s only goal. Patents have traditionally also been 
regarded as serving a number of other objectives, such as attracting foreign 
investment, facilitating technology transfer and dissemination, supporting 
domestic industries, generating trade gains or avoiding trade losses69. This 
is also the case of the TRIPS Agreement, where the patent system is aimed 
to contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology as set out in the general 
provisions and basic principles of the TRIPS Agreement and its Preamble, 
which include reducing distortions and impediments to international trade, 
promoting effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, 
and ensuring that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property 
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade. These general 
goals must be read in conjunction with Article 7, entitled “Objectives”, that 
reflects the search for a balanced approach to IP protection in the societal 
interest, taking into account the interests of both producers and users, 
since IP protection is expected to contribute not only to the promotion 
of technological innovation, but also to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology in a way that benefits both its producers and users and that 
respects a balance of rights and obligations, with the overall goal of 
promoting social and economic welfare. Article 8, entitled "Principles", 
recognizes the rights of members to adopt measures for public health and other 
public interest reasons and to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS 
                                                          
68 See WIPO Guidelines and Manuals of National/Regional Patent Offices, available at: 
www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/gdlines.html. 
69 Declaration on Patent Protection. Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, drafted under the 
auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich, 15 April 
2014, available at: www.mpg.de/8132986/Patent-Declaration.pdf. 
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Agreement70. Both the preamble and Articles 7 and 8, which express the 
general goals, objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement, are to be 
borne in mind when the substantive rules of the Agreement are being 
examined, as repeatedly recognized by WTO dispute settlement panels. 
The same conclusion is confirmed by the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health that provides (in para. 5(a)) that  
 
“[i]n applying the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be 
read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as 
expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles”.  
 
However, the use of the exclusive right can itself contribute to a 
market distortion and can lead to a situation characterized by inefficiencies, 
high prices and the under-provision of goods. The establishment of 
limitations and exceptions to patent protection are integral elements of patent 
governance and crucial to the overall balance of the system of protection. As 
such, they need not to be interpreted in a narrow way; rather, Articles 7 and 
8 of the TRIPS Agreement recognize that the patent system is embedded in 
a framework of policy controls. Article 1(1) of the TRIPS Agreement expressly 
grants WTO members the freedom to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of the Agreement in their own legal systems 
and practice, allowing them to treat different situations differently. 
Differentiation may relate to the requirements of patentability, patent 
eligibility and disclosure to the exclusion of subject matter from 
patentability, as well as to the scope of protection71. Additionally, many 
key terms relating to TRIPS obligations are not defined in the Agreement 
itself, including essential patent law concepts such as “invention”, 
“new/novel” and “involve an inventive step/non-obvious”, which leaves 
considerable discretion to WTO members as to how to apply the three 
criteria of patentability - novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability 
- within their national laws. Further, a number of provisions agreement 
                                                          
70 According to F. M. ABBOTT, WTO TRIPS Agreements and Its Implications for Access to 
Medicines in Developing Countries, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, UK, Study paper 
2a, 2002, p. 46, “it is exceedingly difficult to explain why the WTO agreement most likely 
to impact on public health also most stringently restricts protecting public health”. GATT 
1994 (Article XX (b)) and GATS (Article XIV (b)) allow that Members may adopt measures 
necessary to protect public human, animal or plant life or health that are otherwise 
inconsistent with those agreement. The Author, therefore, suggested to amend Article 8.1 of 
the TRIPS Agreement by conforming it with the comparable GATT 1994 and GATS 
language. 
71 See the Declaration on Patent Protection and its critic on what the WTO’s DSB panel 
mistakenly assumed in Doc. WT/DS114/R of 17 March 2000. 
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have been included in the TRIPS Agreement in order to prevent and correct 
IP undesired effects: the provision that patent rights only last for a limited 
period of time (usually 20 years); exclusions from patentable subject matter; 
patent application, examination and grant procedures, as well as 
opposition, appeal, and other review procedures that allow courts and 
other review bodies to correct erroneous decisions and give relief where 
necessary, in order to ensure that the patent system as a whole functions as 
a public interest policy tool. Thirdly, general exceptions and limitations to 
patent rights are permitted under TRIPS Agreement in order to ensure 
harmony with broader public policy goals, such as ordre public or morality. 
The TRIPS Agreement also recognizes: a) limited exceptions regulated in 
Article 30, to provide certain uses by third parties for private, non-
commercial uses; research or experimental purposes; early working of 
patented pharmaceuticals for the purposes of obtaining approval (the so-
called Bolar provision); and b) compulsory licenses (actually the TRIPS 
Agreement does use rather the term “use without authorization of the right 
holder”) covered by Article 31, which regulates both compulsory licenses 
granted to third parties for their own use and the use by or on behalf of 
governments without the authorizations of the right holder. This norm does 
not limit the grounds or underlying reasons that might be used to justify 
the grant of compulsory licenses, mentioning - among other circumstances 
- national emergencies, other circumstances of extreme urgency and anti-
competitive practices only as grounds when there is not the need to try for 
a voluntary license first72. In addition to the already mentioned flexibilities 
in the process of acquisition of the right and flexibilities related to the scope 
of the patent right, the TRIPS Agreement provides member States also with 
flexibilities related to the use and enforcement of patent right. In this regard, 
they are entitled - in addressing public health concerns - to take necessary 
steps to prevent abusive and anti-competitive practices (including the 
preventive control of such practices in contractual licenses). Competition 
law helps in correcting and preventing anti-competitive behaviours such as: 
(i) abuses of IPRs because of refusal to deal with or imposition of overly 
restrictive conditions in medical technology licensing; (ii) preventing 
generic competition though anti-competitive patent settlement agreements; 
(iii) mergers between pharmaceutical companies that lead to undesirable 
concentration of R&D and IPRs; (iv) cartel agreements between 
pharmaceutical companies, including between manufacturers of generics; 
(v) anti-competitive behaviour in the medical retail and other related 
                                                          
72 See WTO, Module V, Patents, available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_ 
e/modules5_e.pdf, pp. 1-15.  
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sectors. Article 8.2 and Article 40.1 of the TRIPS Agreement stipulate the 
appropriate measures that may be used to prevent any abuse of IPRs73.  
Many of these policy options are often referred to as “TRIPS 
flexibilities”, a term, by the way, that the TRIPS Agreement only limits in 
relation to the special requirements of least developed countries (LDCs) 
members in order to explain the motivation for the additional transition 
period accorded to LDCs74. The expression “flexibility” only became part of 
the wider IP community’s glossary75 at the time of the adoption, in 2001, of 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health76 that clarified the 
term, by referring to flexibilities in a much broader way. Following multiple 
actions by the US and others that had challenged low- and middle-income 
countries’ right to adopt and utilize flexibilities set forth in the TRIPS 
Agreement77, the Africa Group demanded a clarification of those 
                                                          
73 The Trilateral Study, pp.77-79. 
74 LDCs are given an extended transition period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement to protect intellectual property under the TRIPS Agreement, in recognition of 
their special requirements, their economic, financial and administrative constraints, and 
the need for flexibility so that they can create a viable technological base. On 3 November 
2015, WTO members reached an agreement to extend the pharmaceutical waiver for LDCs 
until 2033. In December 2015, the WTO General Council also decided that the obligations 
of least developed country members under paras 8 and 9 of Article 70 of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be waived with respect to pharmaceutical products until 1 January 2033, 
or until such a date on which they cease to be a least developed country member, whichever 
date is earlier. 
75 WIPO’s expert view on classification and flexibilities provided by the TRIPS 
Agreement concluded that they could be classified in just two categories: those regarding 
transition periods and those regarding substantive flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. A 
more detailed classification distinguishes among subject matters which qualifies for 
protection: scope of protection, mode of IP enforcement and matters of administration. See WIPO 
document CDIP/5/4 REV., 18 August 2010, Patent Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral 
Legal Framework and Their Legislative Implementation at the National and Regional Levels, 
Document prepared by the Secretariat., available at: www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_detrails. 
jsp?doc_id=142068, pp. 1- 28. See also M. A. OLIVEIRA, J. A. ZEPEDA BERMUDEZ, G. C. CHAVES, 
G. VELÁSQUEZ, Has the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in Latin America and the 
Caribbean Produced Intellectual Property Legislation that Favours Public Health?, in BWHO, 
2004, pp. 815-821; UNAIDS, WHO, UNDP, Policy Brief, Using TRIPS Flexibilities to Improve 
Access to HIV Treatment, 5 March 2011, available at: www.unaids.org/en/resources/documents/ 
2011/20110315_JC2049_PolicyBrief_TRIPS.  
76 See supra, note 67. 
77 In 1998 a group of 39 pharmaceutical companies along with the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa sued the South African government over its 
medicines act, which included provisions to increase access to lower-priced medicines. 
One of their arguments was that the act was not in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
A massive public outcry against this abusive conduct (at the time, nearly a fifth of the South 
African population was living with HIV) induced the Big Pharma companies to withdraw 
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flexibilities from the TRIPS Council78. The result was the Doha Declaration 
adopted at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, when the 
WTO members struck a pivotal deal which clarified the TRIPS Agreement 
and provided governments in the developing world with greater clarity 
and certainty that protection of patents does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health79. In its seven 
paragraphs the Doha Declaration clarified some of the flexibilities 
contained in the TRIPS Agreement. It recognized: the growing concerns 
over HIV and other diseases; firmly established the primacy of public health 
concerns over IP; firmly supported interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement 
allowing governments to take action necessary to protect the health of their 
populations; and set out plans to cope with the particular need of LDCs and 
countries lacking the capacity to make their own medicines. Paragraph 6 
deals with production for export under a compulsory licence. According to 
Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement, the use of compulsory licensing is 
authorized “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the 
Member authorizing such use”. Member States recognised in Doha that this 
restriction causes problems for countries without local production capacity 
and that rely on importation for their supply of medicines in a world where 
medicines are patented almost everywhere. The Doha Declaration 
promised to find an “expeditious solution” to this problem in Paragraph 6. 
However, it took two years of difficult negotiations at the WTO to arrive in 
2003 at the “August 30” decision, which established a process to allow such 
export on a case-by-case basis80. The System - informally dubbed the 
"Paragraph 6 System" - that initially took the form of a waiver of certain 
conditions regarding compulsory licences, has been transformed in 2005 in 
a Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement. This Amendment has now 
become a permanent feature of the TRIPS Agreement and has entered into 
force on 23 January 201781.  
                                                          
the law suit in 2001. 
78 See Doc. IP/C/W/296 of 19 June 2001. 
79 C.M. CORREA, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WHO publication, 2002, pp.1-55; F. M. ABBOTT (2002), supra, note 70, p.8 ff.; E. ‘T 
HOEN (2009) supra, note 41, pp.19-39. 
80 C.M. CORREA, Implementation of the WTO General Council Decision on Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WHO publication, 2004, pp.1-29. 
81 Many commentators have noted that the Paragraph 6 system has serious flaws, being 
too many cumbersome and not at all conducive to the economic realities on the production 
and supply of generic medicines, as evidenced by the very limited experience: by 2012 it 
has been used only once to supply a triple combination of ARVs from Canada to Rwanda. 
The Trilateral Study, The Paragraph 6 System: Special Export Licences for Medicines, available 
at: www.wto.org/trilateralstudy. See also the Submissions of Contributions to the United Nation 
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To sum up, the analysis of the relevant provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Doha Declaration reveals the total absence of a genuine 
normative conflict between the IP/patent system codified in the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement and the States’ human rights law obligations not only to respect, 
but also to protect and fulfil the right to health. Rather, the current TRIPS 
IP norms can and should, to the maximum extent possible, be interpreted 
as to give rise to a single set of compatible international obligations based on a 
human rights approach in policies and programmes. This conclusion is 
especially commanded in the light of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health that, without being a formal amendment of 
the TRIPS Agreement, and thus having no specific legal status within the 
WTO law82, could be certainly construed both as: a) a subsequent agreement 
under Article 31. 3(a) of the Vienna Convention; or, b) as evidence of 
subsequent practice established the understanding of the WTO members 
regarding interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement83.  
 
 
4 - Conclusions 
 
The above considerations bring us directly to the main point of this 
study: the policy incoherencies between the today pharmaceutical 
innovation system, firmly rooted in the patent system, and the 
fundamental right to health, largely lie outside the IP TRIPS System. 
Essentially they lie in the defective States’ implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement: too many countries still lack sufficient awareness about the 
use of TRIPS flexibilities and/or have limited capacity to implement 
them; these flexibilities are not self-executing and require a lot of 
attention and actions at the national level in order to tailor each nation 
                                                          
Secretary-General’s HLP on Access to Medicines of SOUTH CENTRE_B, 28 February 2016, and of 
KAJAL BHARDWAJ. The WHO Commission on Intellectual Property recommended to keep 
under review the system and to consider appropriate changes to achieve a more workable 
solution. In a 2013 TRIPS Council meeting, India, Brazil and Cuba, also questioned the 
effectiveness of the System, supporting the position that a revision is needed (Doc. 
IP/C/69, pp.8-9). 
82 L. FORMAN, An Elementary Consideration of Humanity? Linking Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights to the Human Right to Health in International Law, in JWIP, 2011, pp. 155-175, 
at p. 166; R. BEALL, R. KUHN, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha 
Declaration: A Database Analysis, 12 January 2012, available at: http://journals.plos.org/plosme 
dicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001154.  
83 See, J. THUO GATHII, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS and Public 
Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in HJLT, 2002, pp. 292-317, at p. 
299.  
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IP regime to respond to each country’s individual needs and policy 
objectives84. Additionally, policies incoherencies lie, essentially, in the 
changed role of patents in corporate management: as clearly pointed in a 
recent seminal Max Planck study, patents are increasingly used as “strategic 
assets to influence the conditions of competition rather than as a defensive 
means to protect research and development outcomes”. The shift of the 
patent from a right of defence to a commercial tool greatly affects the manner 
in which the right to exclude operates in practice. More importantly, in 
many industrialized States with highly developed economies and advanced 
technological infrastructures, there has been another gradual shift of balance 
in the patent regime towards right holders, both by reducing the burdens 
for patent applicants and by extending the rights of patent holders. In turn, 
over the past decades, the governmental autonomy to countervail these 
proprietary rights with the aim to protect the public interest in free 
competition and third parties’ freedom to operate have been progressively 
eroded due to an increasingly complex legal and institutional regime 
consisting of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements85. As a result, 
the ability of States to maintain a proper balance between the need for IP 
protection and the policy space for pursuing diverse public interest goals 
“has been unduly constrained”86. This also as a result of too many 
intimidations, or worst, threats of retaliation from governments and 
corporations against the sovereign right to issue compulsory licences, in 
order to “dissuade” governments from using all the various forms and 
procedures that could protect public health87. Finally, policies 
incoherencies arise when legitimate economic, societal and political 
interests and priorities are misaligned: that is what currently occurs in 
respect of the global “narrative” about the trade liberalization, frequently 
                                                          
84 CIPIH, Study 4C, The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries. Can they 
Promote Access to Medicines? 2005, pp.1-15. 
85 P.K. YU, TRIPS and Its Discontents, in MIPLR, 2006, pp.384-386; H. GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, 
A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to International Trade? Acta Border Measures and Good in 
Transit, in AUILR, 2011, pp. 645-726; A. DI BLASE, Intellectual Property Protection in 
Investment Agreements and Public Concerns, in G. SACERDOTI, P. ACCONCI, M. VALENTI, A. DE 
LUCA (eds.) General Interests of Host States in International Law, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 194-
217. 
86 See Declaration on Patent Protection, supra, note 69. 
87 See WTO, Report of the Panel, supra, note 63, paras 7.88-7.90; S. K. SELL, Trips Was Never 
Enough: vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, in JIPL, 2011, pp. 468-478 (on the 
pharmaceutical firms’ bullying both governments, NGOs and even particular patients); 
OXFAM, HAI EUROPE, Trading Away Access to Medicines-Revisited. How European Trade Agenda 
Continues to Undermine Access to Medicines, 29 September 2014, pp.1-39; EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, Report on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third 
Countries, Doc. SWD(2015) 132 final of 1 July 2015. 
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associated with jobs, capital flows and generation of wealth; while, public 
health objectives, such as access to medicines and universal health care, are 
normally and simply presented to the citizens as an increase in public 
expenditure, difficult to justify in the current wage of global economic 
crisis88.  
In the light of the above considerations, several comments 
submitted to the UN HLP on access to medicines asserted that the 
tensions and policy incoherencies between patents, health technologies 
innovation and access to medicines and treatments, should be solved by 
resorting to a hierarchical relationship and by reference to the “Relations of 
Importance” mentioned in the ILC Report, that derive from Article 103 
of the UN Charter, the notions of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes89. 
All these proposals, despite their different recommendations, are based 
on the same premises: the assumption of primacy of the right to health 
enshrined into the UN Charter, its (uncertain) constitutional nature, and 
the combination of Article 103 of the UN Charter with the treaty obligations 
assumed by member States under Articles 2, 55 and 56 of the Charter. The 
conclusion is that the UN human rights obligations on access to medicines 
must take priority over any conflicting (trade treaty) obligation90. As already 
argued above, the relationships between human rights obligations in 
respect to the right to health and the IP TRIPS system is not a conflict one, 
but a simple relationship of interpretation. As such, it could and should 
be resolved by a systemic and harmonized interpretation through the 
norms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties91. The 
qualification, by the UN human rights bodies, of access to essential 
medicines as a core obligation under the right to health, therefore not subject 
to progressive realization within available maximum resources, a sort of 
an “underogable” obligation in respect of which a State party to ICESCR 
“cannot under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance”, 
does not change this reality. Yet, the right to health is not generally 
recognized as a superior norm under international law, falling into the three 
                                                          
88 A clear example of the difficulties related to these costs is the recent Donald Trump’s 
executive order to repeal the Obama care healthcare reform platform. More details at: 
http://obamacarefacts.com/trumpcare-explained/. 
89 See the Contributions of R. ELLIOTT, supra, note 32; SOUTH CENTRE A, February 26, 
2106; X. SEUBA, Global Health Law Committee of the International Law Association, 22 
February 2016; E. ‘T HOEN, Global Health Law Committee of the International Law 
Association, 22 February 2016; BROOK BAKER, Health GAP_A, 26 February 2016; CHANDNI 
RAINA, Centre for WTO Studies, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade_B, 25 February, 2016; all 
available at: www.unsgaccessmeds.org/new-page/. 
90 R. ELLIOTT, supra, note 32, pp. 20-22. 
91 L. FORMAN, supra, note 82, pp. 162-165. 
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primary sources of hierarchically superior norms, such as a peremptory 
(jus cogens) norms, erga omnes obligations, and Article 103 of the UN 
Charter92.  
So said, in respect of the many difficulties faced by developing 
countries to take fully advantage of the TRIPS Agreement flexibilities, 15 
years after the Doha Declaration, one might rightly questioned the 
usefulness of the many recommendations made in both the HRC resolutions 
and the HLP, that again called for WTO members to commit themselves to 
respect the WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and refrain 
from any action that would limit its implementation and that countries 
should make full use of the flexibilities enshrined in this Agreement. 
Unsurprisingly, many NGOs regretted that the UN bodies were unable to 
reach consensus on bolder recommendations towards more progressive and 
visionary proposals concerning the actual limits of the WTO’s Agreement on 
TRIPS framework to protect access to medicines, strongly rejecting the 
HLP’s premise that the right of access to medicines and other health 
technologies could be resolved within the existing framework of TRIPS 
flexibilities. Some radical proposals have been advanced, directly 
challenging the inclusion of pharmaceutical products and life-saving 
medicines in the same regime as movies and software,  based on incentives 
deemed to mobilize maximal profits for pharmaceutical monopolies rather 
than the unmet health needs of million people. Some submissions to the HLP 
made detailed proposals from full exemption for patenting for all or some 
medicines: in the light of the political pressure exerted by western 
governments and the current litigations brought by big pharma companies 
against countries exercising their right issue compulsory licenses, it has been 
recommended to exempt from IP protection all the medicines on national 
essential medicines lists or on the WHO Model list for essential medicines93. This 
                                                          
92 For a recent reconstruction of the notion of jus cogens norms in international law see 
the Judgment of the UK Supreme Court in the case Belhaj & Anor v. Straw & Ors of 17 
January 2017, available at: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2017/3.html. 
93 The WHO defines essential medicines as “those drugs that satisfy the healthcare needs 
of majority of the population; they should therefore be available at all times in adequate 
amounts and in appropriate dosage forms, at a price the community can afford”. The WHO 
published the first Model List of Essential Drugs in 1977 and identified 208 individual 
medicines which together could provide safe, effective treatment for the majority of 
communicable and non-communicable diseases. The WHO Model Lists are now seen as 
equally relevant to high-, middle- and low-income countries, particularly due to the 
inclusion of new, highly effective and very expensive medicines in more recent years. The 
current Model List of Essential Medicines has been prepared by the WHO Expert 
Committee in April 2015. See WHO, Essential Medicines, available at: 
www.who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines_def/en/. 
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is particularly important especially now, since in May 2015 the WHO added 
several important medicines, including very high price drugs for the 
treatment of cancer, tuberculosis and hepatitis C to its Essential Model List 
(EML)94.  
It is the Author’s personal belief that the TRIPS Agreement is here to 
stay and that any proposed additional formal amendment to the text is 
simply unrealistic. In this respect, it is important to note that the HLP did 
not reach a consensus on the necessity to renegotiate the TRIPS Agreement or 
to amend it. According to the final HLP’s Report “to revise or update these 
existing rights would be to concede ground to any argument of their 
derogability”95. A conclusion, this, objected by three members of the HLP 
who recommended, in their commentary to the Report, that this proposal 
should be pursued in other UN forums96. Neither, did the HLP uphold the 
proposal, requested in a number of calls, for a new United Nations Instrument 
to uphold universal human rights in laws, policies and actions that affect 
health technology innovation and access, that expressly recognizes the 
primacy of human rights. The HLP, rightly, concluded in this respect that 
human rights and other obligations related to access to essential medicines 
already exist and are embedded in United Nations instruments, guidance 
and decisions of human rights bodies and in a number of national and 
regional legal instruments. As to the current IP system, if given proper effect 
and properly observed, the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement  and the 
Doha Declaration would give rise to the necessary protections and 
required balances to protect the human right to health in trade and 
intellectual property matters97.  
In this respect it is the Author’s opinion that a more promising avenue 
would consist in profiting of the “asymmetries” of implementation power in 
respect of the competing obligations in order to take advantage of the much 
stronger WTO accountability system, which - by the way - would require 
collaboration by the WTO. A sound proposal in this respect has been 
advanced by the HLP Report: countries that threaten and retaliate against 
others for using their entitlement under the TRIPS Agreement should be 
forced to face significant serious sanctions, According to the Panel, instances 
of undue political and commercial pressure should be reported to by the 
WTO Secretariat during the Trade Policy Review of members and WTO 
                                                          
94 WHO, MEDIA CENTRE, WHO moves to improve access to lifesaving medicines for hepatitis 
C, drug- resistant TB and cancers, 8 May 2015, available at: http://who.int/mediacentre/news/re 
leases/2015/new-essential-medicines-list/en/. 
95 HLP Report, p. 19. 
96 HLP Report, J. BERMUDEZ, W. BYANYIMA and S. PHURAILATPAM’s Commentary, p. 53.  
97 HLP Report, p. 19. 
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members must register complaints against such pressure, which include 
taking punitive measures against offending WTO Members. This proposal 
could be reinforced by the proposed creation of an additional mechanism to 
be established at the UN HRC, able to receive and investigate complaints 
(by UN member States, civil society, any other stakeholder or even by the 
HRC on its own accord) relating to the violation of human rights treaties 
as a result of trade retaliation (actual or threatened) where countries seek 
to use TRIPS flexibilities.  
In addition, developing countries should start thinking seriously to 
lodge complaints at the WTO dispute settlement units, resorting to an 
increased use of the multilateral dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. 
In the light of the Doha Declaration (a landmark political event) and the 
subsequent legal developments that have shown a growing acceptance in 
State practice of the use of various forms of TRIPS flexibilities in the area of 
public health98, it is probable that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s 
approach and jurisprudence on the TRIPS Agreement would be, nowadays, 
necessarily quite different from the largely criticized cases settled since 
1995, four of which directly addressed pharmaceutical patents, as having 
largely interpreted the object, purpose and context of the TRIPS Agreement 
in favor of protecting IPRs and having given very little weight to arguments 
about public health99. This conclusion is particularly important in respect of 
two complaints lodged at the WTO by two developing countries, India and 
Brazil, against the EU and the Netherlands for seizure of generic drugs in 
transit, claiming that this seizure violated inter alia, Articles 2, 28, 31, 41 and 
42 of the TRIPS Agrement, arguing that the measures at issue have an 
adverse impact on the ability of developing and least-developed countries 
members of the WTO “to protect public health and provide access to 
medicines for all”100. At the moment India settled with the EU, but the 
dispute between Brazil and the EU still remains101. Should this complaint 
                                                          
98 E. ‘T HOEN, (2016) supra, note 10, pp. 49-63 (on the practical use of the Doha 
Declaration since 2001 and trends in the use of the TRIPS Agreement flexibilities).  
99 See L. FORMAN supra, note 82, at pp. 165- 167. 
100 WTO (2010a), European Union and a Member State — Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit: 
Request for Consultations by India, Doc. WT/DS408/1, G/L/921, IP/D/28 of 19 May 2010; 
WTO (2010b), European Union and a Member State — Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit: 
Request for Consultations by Brazil, Doc. WT/DS409/1, G/L/922, IP/D/29 of 19 May 2010. 
101 See India EU Reach an Understanding on Issue of Seizure of Indian Generic Drugs in 
Transit, Press Information Bureau Government of INDIA, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, 
28 July 2011; EU guidelines No 1383/2003 and Its Implementing Regulation No 1891/2004 with 
Regard to Goods in Transit on the Territory of EU, that address the specific concerns raised by 
India and Brazil on medicines in genuine transit through the territory of the EU; see also 
Regulation No 608/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 
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proceed, it would be a great opportunity for the WTO panel to provide an 
“authoritative” interpretation of the TRIPS provisions in the context of the 
Agreement as a whole and in respect of the various HRs agreements, 
beyond the context of HIV/AIDS pandemic. This interpretation, while only 
binding with respect of the particular dispute between the parties, would 
nevertheless provide useful guidance to the WTO in approaching questions 
of innovation and access to medicines for other diseases, not confined to 
HIV as a mean to realize the fundamental right to health. 
Developing countries could also lodge complaints particularly in 
respect of the governments’ rights to address access barriers within the 
current IP system through “automatic licensing” for essential medicines. It 
is not by chance that one of the major specific issues of concerns of pharma 
industries and western developed countries was exactly on the UN call on 
governments to make liberal use of compulsory licenses to override patents. 
The recommendation for effectively automatic compulsory licensing has 
been eliminated by the HLP Report at the very last minute because of lack 
of consensus: some members of the HLP were concerned over the potential 
incompatibility of such measures with the TRIPS Agreement and the 
unintended consequences that may result from such an approach102. Two-
third of the HLP members, on the contrary, along with several members of 
the HLP’s Expert Advisory Group, were of the opinion that automatic 
compulsory licences (CLs) are fully compatible with the letter and the spirit 
of the TRIPS Agreement as long as an “effectively automatic” CL met and 
adhered to the recommendation specified in Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. It would be interesting to know how WTO dispute settlement 
body would treat CLs, in the light of the supposed “unintended” long-term 
consequences of such use (or abuse). In addition, a future WTO panel 
could also consider the compatibility between demands for higher 
standards than the TRIPS Agreement requires and pronounces itself on 
the very lasting academic debate about TRIPS provisions as a “ceiling” 
and not a “floor”, by interpreting the second sentence of the TRIPS 
Agreement Article 1.1 that stipulates:  
 
                                                          
concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003, in OJEU L 181 of 29 June 2013, p. 15 ff.; in literature see K. 
BAKER, Settlement of Regulation Isn't Good Enough, available at: Digital Commons @ American 
University Washington College of Law. 
102 The counter-argument is that companies would be much less willing to invest the 
significant levels of funding required to discover, research and develop new medicines 
due to the significant uncertainty about returns being available for successful, value-
adding products at the end of the journey from concept to finished medicine. See HLP 
Report, M.C. FREIRE’s Commentary, p. 57. 
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“Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law 
more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, 
provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this 
Agreement”103. 
 
As the Indian delegation has noted in its intervention in the TRIPS 
Council, TRIPS-plus measures cannot be justified under Article 1.1; 
enforcement levels cannot be raised to the extent that they contravene 
the TRIPS Agreement104. Finally, the task to harmonize the core human 
rights obligations with other (WTO) legal duties to provide essential 
medicines access and respect of inventor’s rights could be certainly 
fulfilled by domestic courts, that could easily provide consistent 
implementation of different policy oriented obligations105. 
As to the current innovation system, something that the TRIPS 
Agreement does not regulate, there is clearly the need of change to become 
less costly and more responsive to health needs, especially to develop 
missing essential medicines needed to respond to global health problems. 
New R&D models are needed: they should provide for transparent sharing 
of the results of research, ensure transparency of clinical trial results to 
enable independent assessment of the value of a product and include new 
models of financing drug development. 
The idea of an international agreement on R&D (debated since the 
initial proposal in 2004 and continuously supported from a number of 
governments, scientists, Nobel laureates, civil society organisations, and 
other experts) could be crafted under the auspices of the WHO. It should be 
                                                          
103 C. CORREA, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the 
TRIPS Agreement , 2007, p. 25; A. KUR, H. GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, Enough is Enough. The Notion 
of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection, in A. KUR, M LEVIN (eds.), 
Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System, Cheltenham, 2011, pp. 359-407.  
104 TRIPS Council Minutes of June 8-9 2010, Doc. IP/C/M/63 of 4 October, 2010, 
available at: www.org/english/traop_e/trips. 
105 See, H.V Hogerzeil, M. SAMSON, J. VIDAL CASANOVAS, L. RAHMANI-OCORA, Is Access 
to Essential Medicines as Part of the Fulfilment of the Right to Health Enforceable through the 
Courts?, in The Lancet, 22 July 2006, pp. 305-311; JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR DELHI HIGH COURT, 
The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights, available at: 
http://delhicourts.nic.in/ejournals/social_rights_jurisprudence.pdf; The High Court of Delhi 
(Mohd Ahmed (Minor) v. Union of India, et al, W.P.(C) 7279/2013, judgment of 12 February 
2014) is the only national court to our knowledge that has judged in favour of a child born 
to an economically disadvantaged part of society, who has a rare genetic disorder, and who 
would be entitled to free medical treatment, by referring to Indian Constitution, to Article 
12 of ICCPR and to the General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR, as well as to other 
Conventions and regional human rights instruments. See A. DIVER, J. MILLER (eds.), 
Justiciability of Human Rights in Domestic Jurisdiction, New York-Dordrecht-London, 2015, 
pp.105-108. 
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based on the delinkage of the cost of R&D from the price of the end product 
(examples include prize funds, patent buy-outs, open source innovation 
and other new financing mechanisms) and, as a new binding international 
agreement, it would offer several potential advantages in bringing down 
the price of new, patented essential medicines, so they become affordable 
to the communities that need them. Same as happened with the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, entered into force on 27 February 2005, the 
first public health treaty negotiated within the WHO, which has 
significantly contributed to global tobacco control efforts106. 
                                                          
106 See B. BAKER, Background Paper: Existing and prior work, initiatives and proposal to 
improve innovation and access to health technologies, available at: www.unsgaccessmeds.org/new-
page/; HLP Report, 29-32. 
